Fair trade is a means of governing South-North supply chains to increase the benefits of international trade integration for poor southern producers of agricultural and handicraft goods. Although the approach itself is arguably innovative in comparison with commercially orientated supply chains, many consider that its formalisation within third-party, Fairtrade
Introduction
In general, fair trade is firstly concerned with building markets in more wealthy northern countries for poor southern producers of mostly artisan and commodity goods. Secondly, the broad approach requires that 'fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade ' (FINE 2001, p. 1) .
The current chapter however, examines the fair trade movement as a site of continual reflexive and dynamic innovation in the way that cross-border, south-north, supply chains are constructed and governed: particularly in the way that 'fair trade' itself is understood by those proclaiming to participate in this activity.
Fair trade practices emerged after World War Two when mission driven organisations sought to build south-north supply chains not for their own profit motivation, but to serve the welfare and development interests of marginalised southern producers. In this way, innovation emerged from the construction of supply chains that circumvented contemporary barriers to involvement in international trade networks and did so through genuine partnerships between private southern and northern stakeholders. In concrete terms this was achieved through the application of non-market forms of 'relational' governance (See: Gereffi et al. 2005) : for example, in place of seeking to drive down prices paid to suppliers, northern buyers would aim to pay as much as possible after operational costs had been met (Brown 1993, pp. 164-165; Littrell and Dickson 1999) .
During this period, claims to fairness were based on trust relations and the social reputations of often religiously grounded actors such as Oxfam in the United Kingdom (UK) or the Mennonite International Development Agency in the United States of America (USA). However, this model was inherently limited for a number of reasons: not least by the fact that the 'alternative' nature of retailers, situating themselves within religious discourses, only appealed to a relatively small percentage of north consumers (LeClair 2002; Low and Davenport 2006, p. 319) . In order to bypass this developmental blockage, southern and northern stakeholders again collaborated to innovate in the development of third-party certification for fair trade: initially under the name of Max Havelaar in Holland, but the principles and practices of which later informed the creation of an international network of labelling bodies operating under the central coordination of Fairtrade International (abbreviated to FLO, and represented by the specific legally trademarked term 'Fairtrade' 12 .
Although this institutionalisation of fair trade governance has facilitated tremendous growth of the movement, it is widely understood that this has been a double edged sword for two reasons: and it is argued here that the model of fair trade promoted by Fairtrade certification has been less innovative and more conventional than was initially envisioned. Firstly, the integration of fair trade goods into conventional supply chains has required the involvement of corporate actors in decision making processes concerned with the development of certification standards. As a consequence, it is suggested that the strength of initial principles and standards has been undermined: for example, in the opening up of Fairtrade certification to plantation style production, despite the initial mission of fair trade operation to support small farmers and artisans (see below). Secondly, although dedicated, mission driven and not-for-profit fair trade organisations have remained a strong part of the movement (either as part of Fairtrade certification networks or not), they have found it increasingly difficult to highlight the additional value they are perceived to provide. Therefore, it is argued, the success of the Fairtrade system is leading to the active marginalisation of other fair trade approaches and rendering it increasingly difficult for more innovative models to differentiate their activities from profit driven arrangements.
More specifically, this chapter critically investigates the effects of the Fairtrade Town scheme: an accreditation for place-based consumer communities first developed by Fairtrade
International's UK member, the Fairtrade Foundation (Samuel and Emanuel 2012) . Here existing analysis argues that the scheme has promoted the rise of 'Fairtrade absolutism' (Mohan 2010, p. 94) as Fairtrade certification has been prioritised over and above both other certification and alternative fair trade approaches. Having said this, the argument currently rests on the assumption that those communities seeking accreditation comply fully with the Fairtrade Foundation's specific requirements, despite the fact that non-compliance is common place within many private accreditation systems. 
Fair Trade: A background of innovation and conventionalisation
Fair trade activity as it is interpreted in this chapter emerged in the context of the international trade organisation and governance reform that followed the Second World War:
two developments which taken together represented a significant effort at innovation in trade reform aimed at improving international inequalities. As Fridell (2007) identifies, the manipulation of market forces had long been used by the rich and powerful for the development of their own interests. However, 'what makes the [overall] fair trade movement unique is that it has aspired to use market regulation to protect the week, not the strong, and ideally to create a more equal international trade system' (Fridell 2007, p. 25) .
Although the use of non-market institutions by states and international organisations was ultimately frustrated by an emerging neoliberal agenda, a collection of more practical actions did survive. What emerged were grass roots, civil society based innovations that sprung up simultaneously, and collectively offered parallel and alternative supply networks therefore circumvent contemporary barriers of entry for poor southern producers. This movement of movements was highly heterogeneous in their motivations and operations (Gendron et al. 2009, pp. 64-65; Low and Davenport 2006 cooperative developed a 'third-party' governance and certification approach to provide external legitimacy to fair trade operations. The Max Havelaar mark, guaranteed that coffee had been: bought direct from cooperatives for a bottom line price of up to 10 percent higher than the world market price; refinanced by up to 60 percent; and traded within long term relationships (Brown 1993, p. 162) . This development was again a considerable cross-border innovation as it facilitated the migration of fair trade goods out of alternative supply chains operated by social economy actors and into those provided by conventional profit orientated companies (Davies 2007, p. 463) . By 1993 the Max Havelaar mark had a 3 percent share of the Dutch market (Brown 1993, p. 182) and this approach to fair trade encouraged the development of similar initiatives all around Europe and now across the world.
Initially, expansion of the certification approach was under a system of separate National
Labelling Initiatives (NLIs), for example under the Max Havelaar name in Belgium, Switzerland and France (Nicholls and Opal 2005, p. 10) , and that of the Fairtrade Foundation in the UK (Brown 1993, pp. 180-184 (Boonman et al. 2010, p. 17) .
At the national level, in the UK for example, while the national labelling initiative of Fairtrade International, the Fairtrade Foundation has received grant support from the government, the state has also identified that fair trade goods can be purchased as a means to promote sustainable development through public procurement (DFID 2009).
Despite this increasing popularity and support for fair trade however, analysts identify that corporate involvement has turned FLO into a site of 'negotiating, establishing, enforcing and reformulating the standards and certification' (Jaffee 2010, p. 268) in which an increasing amount of concessions have been granted to commercial players (Jaffee 2010; Renard 2005, p. 421 & 424) . This is viewed to have 'weakened' (Jaffee and Howard 2009; Renard 2010, p. 290) or even 'corrupted' (Doppler and González 2007, p. 190 ) the principles and practices promoted, in a way that is detrimental to the interests of southern producers (Reed 2009; Tallontire 2009 ). For example, corporate actors have pushed for lower minimum prices (Barrientos and Dolan 2007, p. 18; Tallontire 2009 Tallontire , p. 1011 and, in perhaps the most extreme case of conventionalisation, even advocated for the total removal of this component from certification (Renard 2010, p. 290) . It might be argued that another area of weakening has been that while FLO mandates the payment of a social premium, there is no requirement for northern buyers to invest in southern production capacity; and where such investment has taken place, it has been aimed at the commercial needs of buyers, rather than the development interests of producers (Macdonald 2007; Tallontire 2009 Tallontire , p. 1009 . Overall, these new interactions have led some to suggest that Fairtrade certification has facilitated a transformation of fair trade operations away from 'relational' supply chain governance models and more towards conventional structures (Reed 2009 ).
Also of pertinence to the current chapter, FLO has been criticised for the way it has managed access to its certification. For example, while the system was initially developed for the express purpose to support small farmers, pressure from supermarkets for large quantities of certified goods has seen extension to plantation style production; and this is argued to have been to the detriment of initial stakeholders (Renard and Perez-Grovas 2007, p. 150 to producers, it is now necessary to pay an up-front fee of €250 and also to bear the costs of inspection and verification, levied at €350 per day (Neilson and Pritchard 2010 , pp. 1847 -1848 .
In parallel to the institutionalisation of fair trade within the Fairtrade certification system, many of the original mission driven founders of the fair trade movement have continued to innovate and professionalise (Fichtl 2007, pp. 15-17) ; and these have been joined by others seeking to create alternative international trade circuits (Barrientos and Dolan 2007, p. 10 ).
Although such organisations might also carry FLO certification, many of their goods remain outside of the system and instead rely on direct contact and trust to uphold their claims of fairness (Bezençon 2011, p. 61; Raynolds 2009 Raynolds , p. 1086 ). More importantly, many organisations go well beyond FLO requirements to promote the interests of southern supply partners. For example, Cafédirect and Divine Chocolate have made it an explicit aim to extend ownership to producers themselves and to invest heavily in producer capacity as a means to redress long standing power inequalities between the North and the South (Doherty and Tranchell 2005; Tallontire 2000) . It is because of these practices that some refer to such organisations as having adopted the 'gold standard' of fair trade (Brown 2007, p. 272) . In some cases there organisations have sought to market their products by incorporating FLO certification into their business model, although this is not always the case. What has emerged as an important issue however is that fair trade practices that go beyond FLO requirements have been at pains to communicate these additional efforts to the consumer.
While some are viewed to have achieved this through diligent and innovative management of marketing strategies, there is a general concern that not all such operations have achieved this so effectively.
Having said this Fairtrade certification is not the only system of third-party legitimacy available in the market. The World Fair Trade Organisation (WFTO) also offers accreditation for fair trade activity that: is not able to access FLO certification due to geographical or product characteristics (Gendron et al. 2009, p. 68) ; or wishes to differentiate themselves from less producer focused operations (Davies 2007; Murray 2011) . In either case, the key point is that the WFTO is a membership organisation which represents '100 per cent authentic fair trade' or dedicated socially orientated organisations (Davenport and Low 2012, p. 5) . Indeed, some analysts go as far as to associated this accreditation with radical interpretations of the fair trade model (Rosenthal 2011, p. 168 In summary then, it has been argued that fair trade initially emerged as an innovation by civil society actors to circumvent the state based neoliberalisation of the global economy. Genuine partnerships between north-south trading partners extended the suspension of market forces within firm operations, and applied this down the supply chain in models of relational governance. However, in a further effort to escape the limited opportunities of alternative trading networks, the introduction of third-party certification is argued to have resulted in a conventionalisation of the fair trade system. In the next two sections, the chapter examines one way in which this has occurred and furthermore, how this narrowing of what fair trade activity is taken to be affects producer stakeholders in the developing world.
The Fairtrade Towns Scheme: Promoting the conventionalisation of fair trade?
Following the success of Fairtrade International's product certification system, and indeed as one of the recent drivers of its widespread adoption (Fisher 2009, p. 995 In order to achieve Fairtrade Town accreditation, a steering group has to submit evidence that the community has met the targets and then continues to improve upon these achievements For this reason, Mohan (2010, p. 94) argues that despite a multitude of private ethical and pro-development certifications available in the market place, including multiple approaches to fair trade, the Fairtrade Town scheme promotes 'Fairtrade absolutism' by seeking to obtain 'a monopoly' for FLO certification; both to the exclusion of non-certified fair trade goods and differently certified goods such as that offered for example by the Rainforest Alliance (Mohan 2010, p. 98) . The specific reason for this concern is that there is insufficient evidence to make a universal claim that FLO certification is necessarily the most appropriate form of private governance with which to promote the interests of southern producers (Mohan 2010, p. 98) . Indeed, the process can also be argued to narrow fair trade to the consumption of Fairtrade certified goods and therefore, by implication, inadvertently promote a more reformist or conventionalised version of the fair trade concept -rather than the more radically innovative set of tools that remain within other approaches and accreditations.
Naturally however, analysis of the requirements set down by governance and certification frameworks is not sufficient evidence to infer that accredited practices are compliant -as research in a wide variety of such systems clearly demonstrates that this is perhaps very rarely the case. 
Malawi and the Limitations of Fairtrade Certification
Alongside commitments to fair trade in its International Development Policy, Scotland has also fostered specific development partnerships with various African countries: the most prominent of which has been with Malawi due to the strong historical precedence of such On the basis of this experience, NASFAM has also sought FLO certification for other Associations -particular one at Mzimba, which also produces groundnuts. However, at the time of fieldwork it was noted that while the group was in theory eligible for certification, the funds required to meet necessary fees were simply not available. NASFAM's Commercial
Manager explained that 'we have an association, a very productive association-we just don't have on any of the budgets around €3,000 to certify them. We have already paid a bit for the audit, if we don't certify this year we have to start from scratch'. This view is supported by other interviews in Malawi 8 and also wider analysis that since the shift to charging producer organisations for their certification, some have not been able to afford the investment. The General Manager of NASFAM Commercial makes the analogy that the Fairtrade certification system '…acts as if you are telling somebody without shoes, ok, I can get you shoes later on, but can you give me your slip-ons. So the guy has to look around for the money to buy the slip-ons, so when they now donate the slip-ons, they are now promised a pair of shoes' 9 .
Another group that NASFAM would like to embed in fair trade supply networks is the Kaporo Small Farmers' Association (KSFA) located in the north of the country in the town of Karonga. This community of farmers is of particular interest to NASFAM as it produces Kilombero rice. Exporting this crop is especially attractive is it has high value potential and also offers a non-traditional export for the organisation and country as a whole.
Unfortunately, while Fairtrade International offers certification for the production and export of rice, it is understood by stakeholders to be difficult and currently impossible to obtain in Malawi 10 . This is because only producer groups located in Thailand, Laos, India and Egypt can readily apply for certification (FLO 2009a) and only where they are growing certain varieties under certain production methods. As a result, before KSFA or any organisation in
Malawi could have their rice certified by FLO, it would be necessary to arrange for the Product Standard to be extended to the country: the primary obstacle of which is setting the minimum price level that would be applied.
This issue of exclusion and extension is something that has been addressed in Fairtrade
International's most recent Strategic Review. Indeed, the current view is that there 'shouldn't be a barrier now' as even where national price structures exist for certain commodities, there is 'now a mechanism for setting that much more quickly' (Interview with senior FLO representative). Unfortunately, when FLO representatives were approached by stakeholders in the Kilombero rice supply chain, no mention of this possibility was made. Indeed, the request was met with the response that nothing could be done until the next price review meeting of FLO's central board, and no preparatory measures were suggested 11 . Although NASFAM have subsequently been offered the option to develop the standard themselves by agreeing a price with a buyer in the market (one of the recognised procedures for expanding the geographical coverage of FLO certification), they are resisting this option given the expected cost and uncertain returns in the initial trading period 12 .
In summary, the problems associated with any tendencies towards 'Fairtrade absolutism' are clearly manifest in this example of a producer group frustrated by the difficulties in accessing While those responsible for the purchase of the rice were aware that the produce was not Fairtrade certified, knowing the origins and background of the rice, they were satisfied that the product fitted the broader principles of the fair trade agenda as they understood them. This is because the rice comes from one of the poorest countries in the world, where the economic situation strongly suggests that the promotion of non-traditional exports is highly important for development. In addition, the fair trade nature of the supply chain stems from the fact that as a democratically organised membership organisation, NASFAM pays prices to farmers based on a calculation of the sustainable cost of production -as opposed to exploiting market failures to drive down the price of agricultural produce as is the practices of other domestic buyers in the country (Chirwa et al. 2002) . In order to extend the social embedding of transactions to the international context, JTS have worked with NASAFM to provide a price that also incorporates domestic transaction costs (processing and transport) based on transparent discussions. Further to this, in the spirit of more radical and innovative fair trade operation, JTS have facilitated the funding of infrastructural improvements to process the rice in the community where it is produced. The farmers' Association can now clean, process and bag its own produce and thus the investment facilitates a well recognised and fundamental process in economic development: the maximum capture or addition of value, both in the community and country of origin. Overall, the supply chain can be consider to be coordinated by the type of 'relational' governance that initially dominated the fair trade movement and is characteristic of more radical, contemporary, fair trade operations (see Reed   2009 ).
Given the nature of their interactions and operations, JTS and Imani Development (the importer's development partner in Malawi), have played an important role in highlighting the opportunity to accredit the Kaporo producer Association through the WFTO 16 . While there remains some concern that such accreditation will not be as well recognised as certification provided by Fairtrade International, the costs involved are minimal and the system is much more accessible to the organisation (see above). In summary, the example of Kilombero rice is a testimony to the potential of continuing cross-border innovation to generate market access for poor small farmers in the developing world. While third-party certification has a great role to play in breaking the need for fair trade to be embedded in trust and knowledge flows, where this proves inappropriate or impossible, it is concluded that more radical uses of social capital can bring great opportunities.
Conclusion
During the last 20 years, the cross-border innovation of fair trade governance, designed to structure South-North supply chains in ways more beneficial for southern stakeholders, has gained significant attention. However, it has been argued above that what started as 16 The fieldwork on which this chapter is based also identified very similar processes of negotiation and contestation concerned with the interpretation of what it means 'to do fair trade' in Malawi.
international cooperation between isolated mission driven actors has been largely co-opted and by corporate and profit making interests. As a result innovation has been reduced as the use of interventionist tools has been weakened: for example, where the structural integration of producer support has been reduced to an additional Social Premium payment and profit orientated actors have even advocated for the withdrawal of the minimum price system.
More specifically, it has been noted that despite the benefits of widening fair trade participation, the rise of Fairtrade International has had the adverse effect of pushing other fair trade approaches to the margins of the movement. This has been of particular concern as it is these alternative practices which are considered to contain the most promising potential for innovation within international supply chain governance. Investigating the effects of the What is important moving forward is that research extends collective understanding of how fair trade is being operationalised in a variety of contexts and moreover, critically investigates the options for further increasing levels of innovation in economic governance. Indeed, understanding of these dynamics is of critical importance. The growing popularity of promoting 'relational' relationship supply chain governance in a variety of sectors and contexts is increasingly evident: particularly in cases where state authority is drawing on these principles as matter of government policy and action (for example, see the legal definition of 'fair trade' in France and the developments of the solidarity economy in Brazil).
While understanding the empirical benefits of these initiatives will be of huge importance, the role of conceptual development and interpretation in contributing to praxis will be key in understanding differentiated outcomes. Only through an adequate consideration of such linguistically embedded innovations will it be possible to evaluate the contribution of alternative economies to global sustainability and development.
